

# License-compliant TLS stack for Apertis targets

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26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	The Apertis distribution provides both a development environment for electron devices as well as a software stack to be used on them. In line with this g the Apertis project strives to provide software components that, where there intent that they form part of the software stack on the devices themselves, free from licensing constraints that may make it unsuitable in certain use ca An example is software licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL-3 <sup>1</sup> (Gen- Public License) or LGPL-3 <sup>2</sup> (Lesser General Public License) which are known to present a problem as they sometimes conflict with regulatory requirement	oal, ce is are ses. eral

and thus Apertis will take measures to avoid such packages being provided as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html <sup>2</sup>https://www.gnu.org/licenses/lgpl-3.0.en.html <sup>3</sup>https://sjoerd.pages.apertis.org/apertis-website/policies/license-expectations/#licensingconstraints

<sup>35</sup> part of the "target" package repositories<sup>4</sup>.

Providing suitable and compatible Transport Layer Security<sup>5</sup> (TLS) libraries has
already required some measures to be taken to meet the licensing expectations
of the Apertis project, but changes in the licensing of newer versions from the
upstream projects now requires a longer term strategy to be considered and
implemented.

# 41 Overview of the existing situation

The "target" section of Apertis ships a variety of packages which use TLS from 42 a provided library. There are a number of software libraries that provide com-43 peting TLS implementations and which are provided under various licensing 44 terms. However, these projects do not always provide the same programming 45 interfaces, thus do not provide a drop in replacement for each other. Whilst 46 some users of TLS libraries may provide some level of abstraction to support 47 more than one TLS library, others may support only one and thus Apertis 48 currently provides GnuTLS<sup>6</sup>, OpenSSL<sup>7</sup> and NSS<sup>8</sup>. 49

• GnuTLS: Apertis currently provides GnuTLS version 3.4.10. This is 50 an approximately four-year-old version of GnuTLS as shipped in Ubuntu 51 Xenial and thus is currently supported by Ubuntu and is expected to 52 be until 2022. GnuTLS is used directly or indirectly via libcurl in just 53 more than a dozen packages in target. Debian Buster, the current main 54 upstream of Apertis, includes a newer version of GnuTLS (currently 3.6.7) 55 though upgrading to this has already been avoided due to licensing issues 56 that will be discussed below. 57

 OpenSSL: Apertis currently provides OpenSSL version 1.1.1. This is a relatively recent release in the 1.1.1 series and is packaged as part of Debian Buster. The 1.1.1 series is currently supported<sup>9</sup> as an LTS release by the OpenSSL project until September 2023. Support for Debian Buster is expected<sup>10</sup> until June 2024.

• NSS: Apertis currently provides NSS version 3.42.1. This version is approximately a year and a half old, and is packaged as part of Debian Buster. As with OpenSSL, support for Debian Buster is expected until June 2024.

<sup>67</sup> Some of the packages requiring TLS support only support one of the currently

<sup>8</sup>https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS

 $<sup>{}^{\</sup>rm 4} {\rm https://sjoerd.pages.apertis.org/apertis-website/policies/license-expectations/\#apertis-repository-component-specific-rules$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport\_Layer\_Security

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>https://www.gnutls.org/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>https://www.openssl.org/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>https://www.openssl.org/policies/releasestrat.html

 $<sup>^{10}</sup>$ https://wiki.debian.org/LTS

provided TLS implementations, often due to licensing compatibility. Other packages, most notably libraries, support multiple TLS backends, frequently including both GnuTLS and OpenSSL as options. For more information, see the detailed analysis in the Appendix.

## $_{72}$ Issue

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The TLS libraries used in Apertis today are currently supported, though this
will not remain the case indefinitely, with Ubuntu dropping support for the
currently used GnuTLS in 2022, NSS and OpenSSL 1.1 losing support in 2024.

Future releases of Apertis would be expected to be based on newer versions of
Debian (as covered in the Apertis Release Flow<sup>11</sup>. As could be expected, newer
versions of Debian have integrated newer versions of these TLS libraries. Whilst
upgrading to newer versions of NSS does not appear to present any issues, the
GnuTLS or OpenSSL may present issues for Apertis:

• **GnuTLS**: Whilst GnuTLS is licensed under the LGPL-2.1<sup>12</sup>, it uses Nettle<sup>13</sup> and GMP<sup>14</sup>. Newer versions of both of these dependencies are now licensed as dual GPL-2 and LGPL-3, rather than LGPL-2.1.

To avoid including GnuTLS under LGPL-3 terms, should Apertis integrate 84 a newer version it would need to be utilized under the GPL-2 terms. This 85 would result in the binary GnuTLS library effectively being used under the 86 terms of the GPL-2 rather than LGPL-2.1. This would restrict Apertis 87 users from using this Apertis provided TLS implementation either directly 88 or indirectly from any non-GPL-2 compatible applications they wish to 89 integrate into their systems, for example in proprietary applications, where 90 it would have the effect of requiring the app to also be GPL-2 licensed. 91

**OpenSSL**: The currently used version of OpenSSL is licensed under a 92 custom GPL-incompatible license. OpenSSL 3.0 (the next major version 93 of OpenSSL) will be licensed under the Apache  $2.0^{15}$  license, which is 94 compatible with the GPL-3, but not GPL-2. This means that GPL-2 95 tools like tumbler, comman, apt or systemd-journal-remote cannot use the 96 newer versions of OpenSSL without effectively becoming GPL-3 licensed or 97 through these upstream projects applying a license exceptions (for example 98 as OpenVPN<sup>16</sup> has). The OpenSSL project do not seem to hold a strong 99 opinion on the compatibility, though  $suggest^{17}$  either not using the GPL 100 or applying an exception should you wish to gain some legal certainty. 101

 $<sup>{}^{11} \</sup>rm https://sjoerd.pages.apertis.org/apertis-website/policies/release-flow/\#apertis-release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/release-flow/website/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/policies/poli$ 

 $<sup>^{12} \</sup>rm https://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/lgpl-2.1.en.html$ 

 $<sup>^{13} \</sup>rm https://www.lysator.liu.se/~nisse/nettle/nettle.html$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>https://gmplib.org/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0

 $<sup>^{16} \</sup>rm https://spdx.org/licenses/openvpn-openssl-exception.html$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html#LEGAL2

Given the security sensitive nature of the TLS stack, utilizing unmaintained soft-102 ware here would be best avoided. Putting maintenance aside, these versions of 103 their respective TLS implementations may not be gaining support for any new 104 ciphers and TLS protocol versions, which will severely limit their usefulness as 105 time progresses. As well as not gaining newer protocol versions, the libraries 106 may not be updated to reflect the frequently changing recommendations regard-107 ing minimal protocol versions<sup>18</sup> that should be supported, which may result in 108 issues when attempting to access sites following the "Modern" recommendation. 109 Additionally, it is likely that newer versions of the packages utilizing these TLS 110 implementations will begin to require functionality added to newer versions of 111 the TLS libraries thus reducing the ability of Apertis to upgrade to these too. 112

<sup>113</sup> It is therefore imperative that a way forward is agreed upon that is acceptable <sup>114</sup> to Apertis' stakeholders.

# **Goals and requirements**

The broad aim of this proposal is to reach a state where Apertis is able to provide TLS functionality not just for the packages contained within its own repositories, but to support applications added by those utilizing Apertis as well.

- **Requirement:** TLS implementation does not require code covered by licenses that are incompatible with the target repositories rules
- **Requirement:** TLS implementation is licensed under terms that does not preclude its use from existing target applications
- **Requirement:** TLS implementation is licensed under terms that does not preclude its use from users proprietary applications

Ideally the solution would also enable Apertis to standardize on a single TLS 126 stack. Each TLS implementation has its own quirks, such as different ways to 127 manage certificates. Standardizing on a single solution would make the platform 128 more coherent and efficient, reducing maintenance by only needing to track 129 security issues and deploy updates for a single implementation. While this may 130 not be viable for the wide range of software provided by Apertis across all 131 repositories, it may be possible to standardize on a single stack for the target 132 components. If standardizing on a single TLS implementation would require 133 excessive effort, an alternative solution would be to have multiple TLS libraries 134 (for example, using GnuTLS only for programs that don't support OpenSSL), 135 but to designate one as the recommended solution for use in products. 136

• **Preference:** Single TLS stack used for components in target.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server\_Side\_TLS

# <sup>138</sup> Alternative SSL solutions

In addition to GnuTLS and OpenSSL, there are a number of other TLS libraries
 available, including:

# 141 BoringSSL

<sup>142</sup>BoringSSL<sup>19</sup> is a fork of OpenSSL being actively maintained by Google for <sup>143</sup>internal use. It currently provides an OpenSSL based API, but explicitly states <sup>144</sup>it comes with no API-ABI guarantees, users should expect API changes as <sup>145</sup>deemed suitable for Googles internal users. BoringSSL maintains the current <sup>146</sup>licensing state, though as it's developed the amount of OpenSSL-licensed code <sup>147</sup>is reduced, in part through the removal of legacy code. Googles additions are <sup>148</sup>currently provided under the ISC license.

#### 149 LibreSSL

LibreSSL<sup>20</sup> is maintained by OpenBSD, it is a fork of OpenSSL v1.0.1, made 150 as a result of the poor maintenance of OpenSSL at the time (but which has 151 since improved). It aims to modernize the code base, improve security, and 152 apply best practice development process. As a result of these goals a lot of 153 legacy code has been removed. LibreSSL maintains the current licensing state, 154 with new additions provided under the ISC license. LibreSSL does not appear 155 to have gained significant adoption which will limit the developer attention it 156 receives. 157

### 158 mbed TLS

<sup>159</sup> mbed TLS<sup>21</sup> is a TLS implementation with a small footprint, targeting embed-<sup>160</sup> ded systems. The mbed TLS library does not provide either the OpenSSL or <sup>161</sup> GnuTLS API, it provides an API at a slightly lower level, requiring more man-<sup>162</sup> ual operations<sup>22</sup> and thus wrappers or porting effort would be required to use <sup>163</sup> it. It is available in two versions, one distributed under the Apache-2.0 license <sup>164</sup> and another separately licensed as GPL-2+, though it's understood that it will <sup>165</sup> drop the GPL-2+ license in the next major release.

#### 166 MesaLink

<sup>167</sup> MesaLink<sup>23</sup> is an OpenSSL-compatible TLS library written in Rust<sup>24</sup>. With <sup>168</sup> it being implemented in Rust it can be assumed to have some resilience due

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>https://www.libressl.org/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>https://tls.mbed.org/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>https://github.com/warmcat/libwebsockets/commit/9da75727858b4d60750cfcefc1673f6783e8719d <sup>23</sup>https://mesalink.io/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>https://www.rust-lang.org/

to this languages focus on safety and MesaLink recently underwent a thirdparty security audit with excellent results<sup>25</sup>. However, MesaLink only supports
modern TLS standards and thus connectivity with older and less secure servers
may be impacted. MesaLink is licensed as BSD-3-Clause, however it uses a
large number of third party libraries, licensed as follows:

- base64: Apache-2.0/MIT
- bitflags: Apache-2.0/MIT
- env\_logger: Apache-2.0/MIT
- enum\_to\_u8\_slice\_derive: BSD-3-Clause
- libc: Apache-2.0/MIT
- parking\_lot: Apache-2.0/MIT
- ring: Based on BoringSSL and thus has parts licensed under the ISC and
   original OpenSSL licensing
- rustls: Apache-2.0/ISC/MIT
- sct: Apache-2.0/ISC/MIT
- webpki, untrusted: ISC
- webpki-roots: MPL-2.0

#### 186 NSS

Network Security Services<sup>26</sup> (NSS) is a set of security libraries developed by
Mozilla. NSS provides its own API, which is currently only supported by a
few of the applications which use TLS in Apertis, thus its use would require
wrappers to be created or porting effort. It is licensed as MPL-2.0<sup>27</sup>.

#### 191 wolfSSL

<sup>192</sup> The wolfSSL<sup>28</sup> cryptographic library provides some compatibility with OpenSSL

<sup>193</sup> via a compatibility header, which maps a subset of the most commonly used

<sup>194</sup> OpenSSL commands to its native API. It provides up-to-date standards support.

 $_{195}\,$  wolfSSL has already been packaged in Debian. It is available under a dual

<sup>196</sup> license, GPL-2+ and commercial<sup>29</sup> licensing terms.

# <sup>197</sup> Possible solutions

<sup>198</sup> We have considered the following options to meet Apertis' requirements.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>https://github.com/ctz/rustls/blob/master/audit/TLS-01-report.pdf
 <sup>26</sup>https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS
 <sup>27</sup>https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/MPL/2.0/
 <sup>28</sup>https://www.wolfssl.com/
 <sup>29</sup>https://www.wolfssl.com/license/

#### <sup>199</sup> Single stack solutions

Despite the relatively large number of TLS implementations, the required application compatibility and licensing requirements mean that there is not a single solution that will work without investing at least some development effort.

Attempting to standardize on a TLS implementation, such as by using the single stack solutions detailed below would therefore result in Apertis carrying significant changes to its packages without any guarantees that these changes could be upstreamed. These changes would thus need to be maintained as part of Apertis.

#### <sup>208</sup> Standardize on GnuTLS, replace use of problematic dependencies

GnuTLS used to use libgcrypt as a cryptographic backend and the code is mostly structured to abstract the backend details. Reverting to using libgcrypt would result in a LGPL-2.1 licensed solution that may be viable for all desired use cases.

A preliminary investigation suggests that GnuTLS may have started to use Nettle outside of the abstracted code, which would complicate conversion back to libgcrypt. More investigation would be required to confirm this.

If libgcrypt is deemed unsuitable, an alternative may be to port GnuTLS to a different cryptographic library such as libtomcrypt (Public Domain) or libsodium (ISC). The effort required to achieve this has not been investigated.

It is likely that any resulting changes would need to be maintained as part of
Apertis. It's not clear the upstream GnuTLS project would be interested in
maintaining another backend.

#### 222 Standardize on an OpenSSL-compatible library

As many of the applications already utilize OpenSSL, another possible approach
would be writing a wrapper for a library which provides OpenSSL compatibility
to also provide the GnuTLS API.

As GnuTLS itself comes with a wrapper providing OpenSSL API, it is believed
that the reverse should also be possible. However, this presents some significant
effort as the APIs are quite different.

An alternative approach may be to port those apps which only support GnuTLS
to utilize the OpenSSL API. The effort required to achieve this has not been
estimated.

Such an approach is of limited benefit as the more widely used and mature solutions providing an OpenSSL API are also licensed in such a way as to be incompatible with the GPL-2, which happens to be the license used by the most critical applications currently using GnuTLS.

# Wrappering a non-GnuTLS/OpenSSL-compatible library to provide both APIs

Standardizing on NSS would fall into this category. This would also be true
for mbed TLS, but the Apache-2.0 license that it is future version are likely to
be solely licensed under would be problematic for GPL-2-licensed applications.
This option would require significant effort (creating wrappers for both GnuTLS
and OpenSSL APIs) and would be a high risk strategy.

#### <sup>243</sup> Multi-stack solutions

Attempting to choose a TLS implementation that is licensed in a manner that will work for the GPL-2-licensed applications through to Apertis' users proprietary applications massively limits the choice of library. Most of the available choices only satisfy one or other end of this spectrum, with NSS and MesaLink being the only solutions that may be suitably licensed, but which also lacks compatibility with critical applications.

As there does not appear to be any single TLS solutions meeting all use cases without significant work, we will consider keeping a multi stack solution as currently employed.

In such a scenario, a newer GnuTLS library could be allowed by accepting its dependencies under the GPL-2 license and restricting its use to places where this license wouldn't be problematic, such as existing GPL-2 software. As the existing applications written exclusively to use GnuTLS are GPL-2 or tolerant of GPL-2, this is viable.

#### <sup>258</sup> Replace OpenSSL with compatible alternative

A number of alternative TLS implementations provide an "OpenSSL-compatible" interface of one form or other. Whilst a number of these solutions are not compatible with the GPL-2, as this solution would require the continued availability of GnuTLS, the choice of replacement can be picked without needing to provide GPL-2 compatibility. This would suggest BoringSSL,
LibreSSL and MesaLink as options (wolfSSL being immediately unsuitable due to licensing).

- BoringSSL: Whilst actively maintained by Google for its own products, the lack of API/ABI guarantees make its adoption risky.
- LibreSSL: It's use inside OpenBSD suggests this will be maintained at least in the mid-term.
- MesaLink: As Rust is good at detecting many security related issues at compile time, its use here brings many advantages, though this needs to be weighed against its lack of support of older TLS standards which may prove problematic in some use cases.

Picking an API-compatible replacement for OpenSSL may provide a solution
for the mid-term, however with OpenSSL set to release its new version at some
point in the future, it is likely that we may start to see applications requiring
compatibility with OpenSSL 3.0 APIs, thus requiring Apertis to reconsider its
solution. Additionally, while these libraries claim OpenSSL compatibility, a
different implementation may result in hard to diagnose bugs being uncovered
in applications expecting OpenSSL.

#### <sup>281</sup> Consider OpenSSL to not pose a licensing issue

The compatibility between the current OpenSSL licensing and GPL-2 is based on the premise that:

- The OpenSSL license<sup>30</sup> contains licensing terms not in the GPL (such as the need to mention use of the software in all advertising material and derivatives not being able to be called OpenSSL).
- 287
   2. Linking OpenSSL with a GPL-2 application creates a derivative work
   288 formed from the two pieces of code.
- 3. The GPL expressly states<sup>31</sup> that one can't "impose any further restrictions on the recipients' exercise of the rights granted herein" to the GPL licensed work.

Likewise, the Apache 2.0 license, to which version 3 of OpenSSL will be release under, contains clauses such as its patent litigation license termination clause<sup>32</sup>.

While the argument made in step (2) is widely held by many, others disagree 294 with this interpretation, especially when the library is dynamically linked to 295 the application. For instance, it might be claimed<sup>33</sup> that a dynamically linked 296 library is only truly combined with the application when run, not when dis-297 tributed, so it would only become a derivative at that point, or it might be 298 claimed<sup>34</sup> as this is the intended interface for interacting with a library this is 299 excluded either due to fair use laws in some jurisdictions or explicitly allowed 300 by the GPL when it states<sup>35</sup> "the act of running the Program is not restricted". 301

A further argument is that the GPL states<sup>36</sup> "as a special exception, the source code distributed need not include anything that is normally distributed (in either source or binary form) with the major components (compiler, kernel, and so on) of the operating system on which the executable runs, unless that component itself accompanies the executable". If the library is distributed as part of the OS and can be considered a major component of it, then this clause doesn't require the library to be considered as part of the software and therefore falls

- <sup>31</sup>https://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.html#section6
- $^{32} \rm http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 \# patent$

<sup>33</sup>https://lwn.net/Articles/548216/

<sup>34</sup>https://www.linuxjournal.com/article/6366

 $^{35} \rm https://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.html\#section0$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>https://www.openssl.org/source/license-openssl-ssleay.txt

 $<sup>^{36} \</sup>rm https://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.html\#section3$ 

outside of the scope of the license. A counter argument to this is that because
the application may also be considered to be distributed as part of the operating
system this exception doesn't apply especially in embedded devices where the
software is distributed preinstalled as a complete entity.

Most distributions seem to either ignore this potential issue or do not consider a policy to be needed. The Fedora project have deemed OpenSSL to be a system library<sup>37</sup> as defined by the GPL and thus there is no incompatibility. Debian historically decided that a linked library creates a derivative work and all the packages it ships should be considered a combined work, though the decision has recently been taken<sup>38</sup> to follow Fedora's lead here.

# **Recommendations**

Whilst a single stack solution would present a number of benefits, this would 320 require a significant outlay in effort one way or another to align the applications 321 to the provided stack and to provide a stack that was licensed in an appropriate 322 manner. Such an effort would result in Apertis straying away from well-trodden 323 paths. Implementing security is hard, it's easy to make mistakes that cause 324 holes. This is especially problematic if the level of review is low, which would 325 be the case for a highly-customized solution compared with existing ones. As 326 a result, we feel that the potential risks of implementing a single stack solution 327 outweigh the benefits it would bring. 328

A two-stack approach requires separate solutions for GnuTLS and OpenSSL. 329 The breakdown of applications supporting GnuTLS and OpenSSL means that 330 we recommend upgrading GnuTLS to a new version for those applications that 331 can use it licensed as GPL-2. The one outlier is the printing support in GTK, 332 which potentially ends up causing GPL-2 dependencies in GTK. Whilst Debian 333 have also declared CUPS as a system library, we feel that the differing use 334 cases for Debian and Apertis make this less of a realistic position to take. We 335 therefore recommend dropping printing support from GTK in order to remove 336 this dependency as we don't feel that this functionality is critical to Apertis' 337 aim. 338

A number of potential alternatives exist for OpenSSL, but some of the solutions are impractically licensed (such as wolfSSL dual-licensed under the GPL-2 and a commercial license) and the remainder do not improve the licensing situation over OpenSSL (they share at least some code with OpenSSL under its original license). As a result it is our recommendation to consider OpenSSL as a system library and continue utilizing it, inline with the other distributions that have documented a specific policy covering this.

<sup>346</sup> The table below summarizes which libraries each of the identified dependents

 $<sup>^{37} \</sup>rm https://fedora$  $project.org/wiki/Licensing:FAQ?rd=Licensing/FAQ#What.27s_the_deal_with_the_OpenSSL_license.3F$ 

 $<sup>^{38} \</sup>rm https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=924937\#105$ 

- <sup>347</sup> we'd expect to use under the above recommendations. We would expect pro-
- prietary applications to either utilize the OpenSSL or NSS libraries as deemed
   appropriate by the individual projects.
- 350 Component
- 351 License
- 352 Via Curl
- 353 TLS Library support
- 354 OpenSSL
- 355 GnuTLS
- 356 NSS
- 357 apt
- 358 GPL-2+
- 359 X
- 360 connman
- 361 GPL-2
- 362 X
- 363 <del>cups</del>
- 364 Apache-2.0-with-GPL2-LGPL2-Exception
- 365 curl
- $_{\rm 366}$   $\,$  curl and BSD-3-Clause and BSD-4-Clause-UC and ISC  $\,$
- 367 X
- 368 X
- 369 X
- 370 glib-networking
- $_{\rm 371}$  LGPL-2.1+ and LGPL-2.1+ with OpenSSL exception
- 372 X
- 373 liboauth
- 374 Expat/MIT
- 375 X
- 376 X
- 377 libmicrohttpd

```
378 LGPL-2.1+
```

- 379 X
- 380 X
- 381 neon27
- 382 LGPL-2.1+
- 383 X
- 384 X
- 385 openjpeg
- 386 BSD-2
- 387 X
- 388 X
- 389 openldap
- 390 OLDAP-2.8
- 391 X
- 392 rtmpdump
- <sup>393</sup> GPL-2+ (tools), LGPL-2.1+ (library)
- 394 X
- 395 systemd
- $_{396}$  LGPL-2.1+ and GPL-2[+] and PD
- 397 X
- 398 X
- 399 tumbler
- $_{400}$  LGPL-2.1+ and GPL-2+
- 401 X
- 402 X

# 403 Appendix

- <sup>404</sup> Details of TLS library usage in target
- 405 Component
- 406 License

- 407 TLS Library support
- 408 Notes
- 409 OpenSSL
- 410 GnuTLS
- 411 NSS
- 412 apt
- 413 GPL-2+
- 414 X
- 415 connman
- 416 GPL-2
- 417 Optional
- <sup>418</sup> Requires GnuTLS for WISPr<sup>39</sup>.
- 419 cups
- $_{420} \quad {\rm Apache-2.0-with-GPL2-LGPL2-Exception}$
- 421 X
- 422 curl
- $_{\tt 423}$   $\,$  curl and BSD-3-Clause and BSD-4-Clause-UC and ISC  $\,$
- 424 X
- 425 X
- 426 X

<sup>427</sup> Curl produces libraries utilizing each of the 3 TLS libraries it supports ('libcurl4-<sup>428</sup> openssl', 'libcurl4-gnutls' and 'libcurl4-nss'). Various tools in Apertis are built <sup>429</sup> against these, with 'libcurl4-gnutls' having been preferred. Most of these pack-<sup>430</sup> ages can also be built with libcurl4-openssl. For some of these packages, the <sup>431</sup> GnuTLS variant was chosen because it has a compatible license (tumbler, sys-<sup>432</sup> temd). Used by 'liboauth0', 'libopenjpip-server', 'systemd-container', 'systemd-<sup>433</sup> journal-remote' & 'tumbler-plugins-extra'.

434 glib-networking

435 LGPL-2.1+ and LGPL-2.1+ with OpenSSL exception

- 436 X
- 437 X

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WISPr

- 438 neon27
- 439 LGPL-2.1+
- 440 X
- 441 X

<sup>442</sup> Used by syncevolution (LGPL-2.1+). Review needed to determine whether
<sup>443</sup> syncevolution is necessary in target.

- 444 openIdap
- 445 OLDAP-2.8
- 446 X
- 447 X
- 448 X
- 449 rtmpdump
- 450 GPL-2+ (tools), LGPL-2.1+ (library)
- 451 X
- 452 X

453 Currently using GnuTLS, Nettle and GMP, though may use OpenSSL instead.

This is only used by libcurl in target, this functionality may be able to be disabled.

# 456 Usage of libcurl

- 457 Component
- 458 License
- 459 Expected libcurl variant
- 460 Notes
- 461 OpenSSL
- 462 GnuTLS
- 463 NSS
- 464 liboauth
- 465 Expat/MIT
- 466 X
- 467 X
- 468 libmicrohttpd

469 LGPL-2.1+

470 X

471 X

472 X (test suite only)

473 Used by systemd-journal-remote and systemd-pull. Requires GnuTLS for474 HTTPS support (optional).

- 475 openjpeg
- 476 BSD-2
- 477 X
- 478 X
- 479 Used by libopenjpip-server.
- 480 systemd

 $_{\tt 481}$  LGPL-2.1+ and GPL-2[+] and PD

- 482 X
- 483 X

484 Uses libcurl via libmicrohttpd for systemd-journal-remote and systemd-

- 485 container (systemd-pull), see above.
- 486 tumbler
- $_{\tt 487}$  LGPL-2.1+ and GPL-2+
- 488 X

# 489 Usage of GMP

Component	License	Notes
dnsmasq	GPL-2/GPL-3	
gcc	GPL-3	Already licensed under the GPL-3 with an exception for the runtime
ruby-google-protobuf	BSD-3-Clause	Built by the 'protobuf' package, nothing actually depends on the rule